Monetary policy in a low inflation environment by J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr.




t’s a pleasure to be here today and to have this opportunity to comment on





over the last several years we have succeeded in reducing the inﬂation rate to
about 11
2 percent as measured by the core personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) price index—today’s favored inﬂation index—and in stabilizing the
rate at that level. In the parlance of the day, we have ﬁnally attained “price
stability,” meaning both low actual inﬂation and the credible expectation in
the minds of ﬁnancial market participants and the general public that it will
persist, which together constitute the monetary policy equivalent of ﬁnding
the Holy Grail.
In my brief remarks I want to do four things. First, I will compactly
review several key aspects of the evolution of monetary policy over the last
thirty years. To appreciate fully the nature of the challenge that lies ahead,
it is essential to understand how price stability was lost in the 1970s and re-
gained in the ’80s and ’90s. Second, I will try to convey the essence of the
current strategy of Fed monetary policy. I’ll then close with a brief discussion
of the challenges monetary policymakers face in today’s low inﬂation envi-
ronment, as I see them, and a pitch for explicit inﬂation targeting as a means
of preserving the substantial improvement in the effectiveness of monetary
policy during theVolcker-Greenspan years. As usual, these views are my own
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and don’t necessarily reﬂect those of my Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) colleagues. Also as usual, my views have been strongly inﬂuenced
by discussions with, and the writings of, my longtime Richmond Fed col-
league Marvin Goodfriend—in particular a preliminary version of a paper he
will deliver at a National Bureau of Economic Research conference on inﬂa-
tion targeting later this month. He is not necessarily responsible, however, for
anything I say here today.
1. HOW PRICE STABILITY WAS LOSTAND REGAINED
It is probably fair to say that, after periods of moderate inﬂation in the 1950s,
the economy returned to virtual price stability in the early 1960s. The core
CPIinﬂationrateﬂuctuatedinanarrow1.0to1.6percentrangebetween1960
and 1965. Subsequently, as you all know, it increased steadily to double-digit
levels in the mid-1970s and again in the late ’70s.
Thisextraordinaryanddebilitatingincreaseininﬂationhasbeenattributed,
inwholeorinpart, tomanythings: thetwooilpriceshocksinthe’70s, excess
demand associated with the Vietnam War buildup and the Great Society so-
cial programs, the ineffectiveness of the NixonAdministration’s price control
program and the Ford Administration’s “Whip Inﬂation Now” program, and
even the failure of anchovy harvests off the coast of South America. Both
theory and historical evidence, however, indicate that inﬂationary monetary
policy was the central culprit.
The failure of monetary policy to contain inﬂation in this period can be
approached from several directions. Economists of a monetarist persuasion
argue that persistently above-target money supply growth, and the practice
of adjusting the money supply target’s base up each year to accommodate
the preceding year’s upside miss, was the principal operational deﬁciency.
Currently, the more mainstream view focuses on the failure of the Fed’s short-
run interest rate policy to counter the rise of inﬂationary pressures promptly
duringbusinessexpansions. The1970sandearly1980saresometimesreferred
to as the period of “go-stop” monetary policy. Concerned about the potential
impactofpolicytighteningonemploymentandproduction,theFedwouldwait
until a broad public consensus emerged that inﬂation was a serious problem
before acting decisively to contain it. By then, however, it was generally too
late to bring inﬂation down via tighter monetary policy without at the same
time touching off a recession. The cycles surrounding the 1980 and 1981–82
recessions illustrate this pattern especially well.
More fundamentally, however, it is not an exaggeration to say that Fed
monetary policy lost all or most of its credibility as an effective force against
inﬂation in this period. As inﬂation began to rise, ﬁnancial markets and the
public—even in the early stages of expansions—quickly revised their inﬂa-
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inﬂation, pushed up long-term interest rates, and in general helped foster the
macroeconomic malaise described by the term stagﬂation.
Perhaps the most important lesson for monetary policy from this experi-
enceishowdifﬁcultandcostlyitisfortheFedtorebuilditscredibilityforlow
inﬂation once it has been lost—especially when, for all practical purposes, it
has been totally lost, as in the late ’70s and early ’80s. Led by Chairman
Volcker, the Fed had to raise nominal short-term interest rates to unprece-
dented levels and essentially induce one of the longest and deepest recessions
in the entire post–World War II era just to begin the process of restoring its
credibility for low inﬂation. It is highly doubtful that the process could have
begun without this costly recession, in which real GDP declined 2.8 percent
and the unemployment rate rose to 10.8 percent. And it has taken the Fed
about twenty years—nearly a quarter century—to complete the process.
Theessenceofthisprocess,inmyview,hasbeentheFed’sdemonstration,
particularly in two episodes, that it can preempt an increase in inﬂation with-
out precipitating a recession, and its success in recent years in convincing the
markets and the public that it will routinely do so in the future. One of these
episodes came early in the process, in 1983 and 1984, as the economy recov-
ered from the 1981–82 recession; the other was in 1994 when the recovery
fromthe1990–91recessionﬁnallybegantogathermomentum. Inbothcases,
incipient inﬂationary pressures were quickly picked up by ﬁnancial markets,
which produced what Goodfriend calls “inﬂation scares,” characterized by
sharply rising nominal bond rates. In both instances the Fed acted swiftly and
decisively to preempt inﬂation. The 1994 episode was especially important
since it occurred at a time when Fed policy had become much more transpar-
ent than earlier, as evidenced by its decision that year to announce publicly its
federal funds rate target immediately following each FOMC meeting.
2. THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF MONETARY POLICY
The U.S. economy has now enjoyed virtual price stability since about 1996.
There seems to be a growing consensus currently among monetary policy-
makers, close observers of the policy process in ﬁnancial markets, Congress
andthepress, andindividualAmericansinterestedinpolicythatpricestability
and the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation should be sustained. This consensus
is based partly on a broader public appreciation of the high costs of reestab-
lishing lost credibility, as described above. More fundamentally, however, it
appears to reﬂect a recognition that the Fed’s revived credibility is beneﬁcial
to the economy—speciﬁcally, that the Fed can contribute meaningfully to an
improved longer-term U.S. economic performance in the form of an increase
in the sustainable growth of production and higher employment. Further,
the public seems less concerned than earlier about possible short-run costs
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low inﬂation has now been accomplished. And since low inﬂation is broadly
expected to persist, the public would be surprised and disappointed if it were
lost. Consequently, the consensus arguably sharpens the Fed’s accountability
for maintaining low inﬂation.
Against this background, I sense the emergence within the Fed of a more
cohesive strategy of monetary policy than at any other time in the last three
decades. To my mind it consists of two elements: (1) a strong commitment
to maintaining high credibility for low inﬂation permanently, and (2) active
management of real short-term interest rates to help stabilize the economy in
the short run. Regarding the ﬁrst, Goodfriend argues in his forthcoming paper
that the Fed is now practicing “implicit” inﬂation targeting. As he points out,
withthecoreinﬂationrateinthe1to2percentrangesincethemid-1990s, itis
hard to imagine the Fed now accepting a sustained inﬂation rate signiﬁcantly
above 2 percent. Nor would it be likely to accept a sustained rate signiﬁcantly
below 1 percent given the increased sensitivity to the risk of deﬂation and the
proximity of the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
I personally believe that “implicit longer-term inﬂation targeting” is an
accurate description of the ﬁrst element of the Fed’s current strategy. It is
important to stress, however, that its ultimate objective is not price stability
and high Fed credibility for its own sake, but the optimal ﬁnancial foundation
these conditions provide for strong real growth and high employment.
Moreover, these conditions enable the Fed to pursue the second ele-
ment of the strategy: active countercyclical short-term interest rate policy.
When the Fed’s credibility was very low in the 1970s and early ’80s, it was
difﬁcult—perhapsimpossible—toconductcountercyclicalinterestratepolicy
effectively. With the Fed’s long-run objective for inﬂation still unclear, the
publiccouldnotconﬁdentlydeducethelonger-termramiﬁcationsofparticular
short-term policy actions, and the Fed, in turn, could not conﬁdently predict
the public’s reaction to its actions. With its credibility for low inﬂation now
wellestablished,theFedcanactbothmorepromptlyandmoreaggressivelyto
counter the effects of unanticipated shocks and thereby stabilize the economy
in the short run. Beginning exactly two years ago today, the Fed began to ease
policy in response to the softening of the economy in the second half of 2000.
It accelerated the easing process in the wake of 9/11, and over the course of
the two-year period has reduced the federal funds rate 51
4 percentage points,
from 61
2 percent to its present level of 11
4 percent. This is arguably the most
aggressive series of policy easings taken to cushion a softening economy in
the Fed’s history and may well account for the apparent brevity of the recent
recessiondespitetheextraordinarydeclineinthestockmarket,9/11,andother
shocks.
The two elements of the Fed’s current strategy, then, are complementary
and mutually reinforcing. Implicit inﬂation targeting enhances the effective-
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policy makes implicit inﬂation targeting acceptable, since the ability to act
aggressively to stabilize the economy in the short run provides a clear and
easily understood rationale for containing inﬂation.
3. CHALLENGES INA LOW INFLATION ENVIRONMENT
WITH IMPLICIT INFLATION TARGETING
After such a long struggle, one might expect that Fed monetary policymakers
wouldberelativelycomfortablenowthatpricestabilityhasbeenachievedand
credibilityforlowinﬂationhasbeenreestablished. AndIthinkmost,ifnotall,
policymakers are more conﬁdent that the Fed can contribute constructively to
the economy’s longer-term performance rather than retarding it, as occurred
when inﬂation was high and variable, and credibility was low.
But the Fed still faces signiﬁcant policy challenges in the new low in-
ﬂation environment. Historically, little practical attention has been given to
the possibility of excessively sharp disinﬂation and deﬂation. And with the
press here I need to emphasize at the outset that I do not believe deﬂation is
a serious present risk to the economy. But policymakers obviously need to
think more about how they would deal with a deﬂationary threat, should one
emerge unexpectedly, when inﬂation is ina1t o2percent range than when it
is at 6, 7, or 8 percent. This is especially so with the nominal funds rate, our
principal short-term policy instrument, only 125 basis points above zero.
We have been thinking about it, and I am quite conﬁdent that we could
deal with a deﬂationary threat successfully. In October 1999 the Fed spon-
sored a conference inWoodstock,Vermont, on conducting monetary policy in
a low inﬂation environment attended by a large number of leading monetary
economists. The participants gave substantial attention to deﬂation and how
to deal with it should it arise in the future. More recently, Fed Governor Ben
Bernanke nicely summarized current thinking on this issue in a speech to the
National Economists Club. There is now broad agreement that the most ef-
fective way to deal with deﬂation is to prevent it from developing in the ﬁrst
place. In the present situation, the Fed’s aggressive easing over the last two
years appears to have preempted any signiﬁcant drift toward either excessive
disinﬂation or deﬂation. Moreover, even if disinﬂation unexpectedly intensi-
ﬁed and the funds rate were reduced close to the zero bound, the Fed would
still have a number of channels available to reestablish a comfortably positive
inﬂation rate. For example, it could increase broad liquidity by purchasing
long-term bonds.
The other potential policy challenge I see in today’s low inﬂation envi-
ronment is how to handle an incipient increase in inﬂation above its implicit
target range. This possibility is not on many radar screens currently, but it
is obviously a longer-term risk—arguably the most likely longer-term risk. I
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above argues strongly for prompt action to preempt any sustained increase in
inﬂation. If policymakers had precise, detailed foreknowledge of the relative
costs, in terms of lost production, of alternative paths back to price stability,
it might be feasible to tune the return more ﬁnely. There is little evidence,
however, that we have such knowledge. Hence, it seems reasonable to resist
any deviations from price stability promptly and strongly—and preferably
preempt them altogether.
4. CONCLUSION—SUSTAINING THE PROGRESS
Hopefully these comments have convinced you that the conduct of monetary
policy in the U.S. has improved signiﬁcantly during the last two decades, and
that this improvement of policy holds out the prospect of an improved longer-
term economic performance going forward. The trick now is to sustain the
progress. Much of the progress, in my view, is due to the exceptionally strong
leadership since 1979 of, ﬁrst, Paul Volcker and now Alan Greenspan. But,
ultimately, high-quality monetary policy—i.e., sustained credibility for low
inﬂation as a foundation for strong real growth—is too important to be depen-
dent on exceptional leadership alone, which, after all, cannot be guaranteed
overthelongpull. Theprogressinrecentyearsneedstobeinstitutionalized—
“locked in”—in some manner.
There are probably several ways this could be accomplished. Earlier I
referredtooneelementoftheFed’scurrentpolicystrategyasimplicitinﬂation
targeting. My personal preference for “hardening” our credibility is to make
the implicit target both explicit and quantitative—speciﬁcally, 1 to 2 percent,
based on the core PCE index. Explicit, quantitative inﬂation targeting is
practiced by a number of other leading central banks around the world, and it
wouldbeconsistentwiththecontinuingevolutionofFedpolicytowardgreater
transparency and accountability. Most importantly, it would be a strong and
visible step toward ensuring that the Fed’s current high credibility for low
inﬂation will be maintained indeﬁnitely so that we can make our strongest
possible contribution to maximum sustainable growth in the long run and
economic stability in the short run.